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We examine security of a protocol on cryptographic key distribution via classical noise proposed
by Yuen and Kim (1998 Phys. Lett. A 241 135). Theoretical and experimental analysis in terms
of the secure key distribution rate shows that secure key distribution is possible even if the eaves-
dropper could receive more photons than the legitimate receiver, as long as the signal-to-noise-ratio
(SNR) of the receiver is better than -9dB of the eavesdropper’s SNR. Secure key distribution was
demonstrated at the maximum rate of 0.04 bit per sender’s bit and transmission rate of 2 Mb/s in
the experiment employing conventional ber optics. The present protocol has advantages of the e-
cient key distribution and the simple implementation over other quantum key distribution protocols.
However, careful design and management are necessary to keep the security of the crypto-system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography aims to transmit a message from a sender
(referred to as Alice) to a receiver (Bob) over a commu-
nication channel without leaking useful information to
others. It has been proved that secure message transmis-
sion can be achieved if the message is coded and decoded
by a sequence of random bits (key) whose length is equal
to that of the message. The problem is then reduced to
the generation of a shared secret key by Alice and Bob.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols provide a so-
lution to the unconditionally secure key generation, the
security of which originates from the laws of quantum
mechanics. In contrast, the classical crypto-systems rely
on computational complexity, and may be broken by an
eective algorithm or a powerful computer. This remark-
able advantage of QKD attracts increasing research in-
terests [1{5] since the proposal of a protocol by Bennett
and Brassard [1]. QKD has been demonstrated in over 20
km ber communication channels [6{10]. In spite of such
successful demonstrations, it is not straightforward to ap-
ply QKD to practical communication systems. The QKD
protocols require single photon transmission to guarantee
the security. They are thus vulnerable to loss and noise
in the transmission channels. Optical ampliers will not
resolve the problem; the noise from the optical ampli-
ers inevitably destroy the quantum correlation. Single
photon transmission demands complicated and inecient
photon counting technique instead of conventional analog
detection; besides a true practical single photon source
is still beyond our reach. The QKD protocols are there-
fore not fully compatible with the current optical ber
communication systems. It is desirable to establish a se-
cure key distribution protocol compatible with the cur-
rent systems: a protocol that uses more than one photon
and allows optical ampliers. A possible protocol would
be based on coherent state photons or classical light.
Maurer [11] has shown perfect cryptographic security
is possible in classical noisy channel with the help of a
noiseless feedback channel. Yuen and Kim [12] examined
the principles underlying the QKD protocol with non-
orthogonal two quantum states (B92 protocol [5],) and
proposed a classical noise-based protocol for key distri-
bution. The security of the B92 protocol relies on two
facts [13]: (i) an eavesdropper (Eve) cannot determine
the value of each transmitted bit with high accuracy,
i.e., no ecient opaque eavesdropping. (ii) Eve can-
not closely correlate Bob’s measurement results with her
own, i.e., no ecient translucent eavesdropping. Yuen
and Kim pointed out these two condition can be satised
in a classical transmission system with a small signal-to-
noise-ratio (SNR) under independent additive noise for
Bob and Eve. This protocol (referred to as YK proto-
col,) working with classical light, would have advantages
in practical implementations. Security in YK protocol
is, however, subtler than in QKD protocols. Since many
photons are transmitted for the one bit information, the
conditions (i) and (ii) may be broken by improving SNR
of Eve’s detection. Eve’s SNR can be improved by us-
ing low noise detection equipment, or simply by staying
closer to Alice than Bob (due to nite ber loss.) Early
analysis on the security of YK protocol has assumed the
identical SNR for Bob and Eve [12]. It is important to
determine the tolerance of Eve’s SNR for practical im-
plementation.
In this article, we examine quantitatively the security
of the YK protocol in terms of secure key distribution
rate. We nd that the YK protocol is secure, even if
Eve’s SNR is better than Bob’s by about 9 dB. We will
also show the experiment that demonstrates secure key
distribution against translucent attack by a eavesdrop-
per. Section 2 provides the condition for secure key dis-
tribution in terms of the secure key distribution rate.
Section 3 describes the experiment on the YK protocol
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using conventional ber optics. Section 4 discusses the
implementation issues.
II. THEORY
We rst dene the secure key distribution rate. Sup-
pose Alice transmits an equally probable binary string
to Bob. Shannon information between Alice and Bob is
expressed by
IAB = 1 + eB log2 eB + (1− eB) log2 (1− eB) ; (1)
where eB denotes the error rate of Bob’s decision. Bob
posses only nsiftIAB bit information out of the nsift
sifted bits, due to the decision errors. Alice and Bob
exchange redundant information over the public channel
to obtain the reconciled key. This procedure is called
error correction, the best known practical protocol of
which is given by Brassard and Salvail [14]. The error
rate should be less than 0.15 for successful error correc-
tion with Brassard-Salvail’s protocol. To establish a se-
cret key, Alice and Bob employ privacy amplication [15],
random hashing of the reconciled key into a shorter key.
If we shorten the reconciled key of length nrec by the
fraction of  and sacrice nS bits as a safety parameter,
Eves’s Shannon information on the nal key of length





The fraction  is given by
 = 1 + (1=nrec) log PC ; (3)
where the collision probability PC (X) of X is dened as
follows: Let X be a random variable with alphabet X
and distribution PX . The probability that X takes on
the same value twice in two independent experiments,
that is, PC (X) =
P
x2X PX (x)
2. The logarithm of the
collision probability thus refers to Eve’s information on
the key. The collision probability can be expressed by the
probability p(k) that k is the i-th signal of Bob’s string,
and the joint probability p(k; l) that k is the i-th signal
of Bob’s string and l is the i-th signal of Eve’s string.
Then the fraction  reads [16]








Finally Bob can generate secure bits from his sifted bits
at the rate of [17]
R = IAB − (1− eB)  − eB: (5)
We refer this rate R as the secure key distribution rate.
The rate R should take a positive value to achieve secure
key distribution. Actual key generation rate on Bob is
further reduced by multiplying the generation rate of the
sifted key from the raw bit string. In the following, we
will derive conditions to obtain the positive R in the YK
protocol.
In the YK protocol [12], the bit values (\0" and \1")
are encoded so as to provide symmetric probability dis-
tribution of the received signal. Alice sends encoded bits
on a weak classical light. For these bipolar signals, signal
s0(t) = S(t) is transmitted for \0", and s1(t) = −S(t)
is for \1", where
R
T (t)dt = 1. We here measure the
signal as a voltage on the load resistance R of a pho-




s2i (t)dt, and S
2=R represents signal energy over
the duration T (signal energy per bit.) The output of the
detector, r(t), contains noise n(t) as r(t) = si(t) + n(t).
If the noise is white Gaussian with spectral density 2,
the probability distribution of the detected signal V is
expressed by
P (V ) =













where the signal is averaged over the duration T as
V =
R
T r(t)dt. The SNR 
2 in this system is dene by
 = S=. In conventional decision scheme, the bit values
are determined to be \0" if V > 0 and \1" if V < 0. The
decision error will occur at the rate of Q (), where Q is








We set a threshold Vth = mS (m > 1) to make a de-
cision:\0" if V > Vth and \1" if V < −Vth, but leave
inconclusive if −Vth  V  Vth. The probability of mak-
ing a decision is
F+ = Q ((m + 1)) + Q ((m− 1)) ; (8)
and the error rate is
e =
Q ((m + 1))
F+
: (9)
The decision rate F+ refers to the generation rate of the
sifted key from the raw bit string. As seen in Eqs. (8) and
(9), the decision rate F+ and error rate e are determined
by the values of SNR and threshold. As described below,
the joint probabilities p(k; l) and therefore the secure key
distribution rate are calculated with the error rate. The
system is fully characterized by SNR and threshold. The
error rate can be reduced by increasing the threshold.
Nevertheless, a high threshold will also diminish the de-
cision rate. Since the decision rate decrease faster than
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the error rate as shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, it is im-
practical to set the threshold value too high.
The inconclusive results play a essential role to guaran-
tee the secure key distribution, as in B92 protocol [5]. As
seen in the above, a nite threshold value of Bob results
in accurate decisions at the cost of the reduction of the
sifted key bits. Eve, on the other hand, should make a
decision with zero threshold to obtain conclusive results
for all the transmitted bits. A nite threshold in Eve’s
decision will results in the inconclusive results to the bits
that Bob could make decisions. The assumption of the
independent noise prevents Eve from predicting which bit
Bob would make a decision. Eve can acquire no informa-
tion for these inconclusive bits. Since Eve’s error rate
eE is less than 1/2, she will have more information by
making a decision with zero threshold. Therefore, Bob
obtains more information on the sifted key bits than Eve,
and can distill secure key bits.
Now we will examine the conditions for security against
eavesdropping. We here consider only two simple eaves-
dropping, translucent attack and opaque attack, and ig-
nore proposals of sophisticated eavesdropping, because
of the lack of practical quantum gates. The translucent
attack can be done simply by putting a beam splitter on
the transmission channel in YK protocol. This translu-
cent attack will not change the state of the transmitted
light in contrast to those in the QKD protocols. The
probability distribution of Bob’s bits is same as Alice’s:
p(0) = p(1) = 1=2, because Alice and Bob share com-
pletely correlated results after error correction. The joint
probabilities p(k; l) are p(0; 0) = p(1; 1) = (1−eE)=2 and
p(0; 1) = p(1; 0) = eE=2. The fraction  is calculated
with Eq. (4) as
 = 1 + log2
(
1− 2eE + 2e2E

: (10)
The secure key distribution rate can be estimated with
Eqs. (1), (5) and (10). Figure 3 shows the requirement
for Eve’s error rate as a function of Bob’s. Eve’s error
rate should be increased to obtain a positive secure key
distribution rate as Bob’s error rate eB increases. For
example, if Bob’s error rate is 0.15, Eve should make an
error in her decision at the rate more than 0.27. This im-
plies that SNR of Eve’s system should be less than 0.38
for white Gaussian noise. On the other hand, Bob’s SNR
should be better than 0.057 to keep his error rate smaller
than 0.15 and his decision rate at 10−3. Therefore, the
secure key distribution is possible even if Eve’s SNR is
six times (8 dB) as large as Bob’s. The tolerance of the
SNR increases as Bob’s error rate decreases, and reaches
10 dB for eB = 0:01.
In opaque attack, Eve receives all the photons for n
bits out of the n bits sent by Alice. Then Eve sends the n
bits to Bob according to her decision. Eve never touches
the rest of the bits ((1− )n bits) and just forward them
to Bob. Bob should determine his threshold from the av-
erage signal intensity of each bit to protect information
from the opaque attack. If he only observe the average
intensity over many bits, Eve can set a nite decision
threshold to reduce her error rate. Eve will then obtain
conclusive results for γn bits (γ < 1:) If she sends only
the conclusive results with γ−1 times as intense signals
as received, Bob will obtain the same long-time average
signal intensity whether Eve absorbs the photons or not.
If Bob observes the signal intensity of each bit, Eve must
send every bit with the same intensity as she receives.
Eve then should make a decision with zero threshold,
otherwise she will loose the information on the inconclu-
sive results. There is a trade-o for Eve on the fraction
: a large  will increase Eve’s information gain, but will
also make Eve easily detectable by the increase of Bob’s
error rate eB. Bob obtains the correct results at the
probability of 1− eB for (1− )n bits left by Eve. This
probability decreases to (1− eE) (1− eB) + eEeB for n
bits received by Eve. The eavesdropping increases Bob’s
error rate to
e0B = (1− ) eB +  [(1− eE) eB+eE (1− eB)] : (11)
To calculate the secure key distribution rate by Eqs. (1),
(5) and (10), we estimate the joint probabilities p (k:l)
in the following. After the error correction, Bob posses
(1−e0B)nF+ bits with the probabilities p(0) = p(1) = 1=2:
Eve obtains (1 − eE) (1− eB) nF+ +(1=2)(1 − )(1 −
eB)nF+ correct results and eEeBnF++(1=2)(1−)(1−
eB)nF+ incorrect results for Bob’s bits. The joint prob-
abilities are obtained as
p (1; 1) =
[(1− eE) (1− eB)  + (1− eB)(1− )=2] nF+
2 (1− e0B)nF+
=
[(1− eE)  + (1− ) =2] (1− eB)
2 (1− e0B)
p (1; 0) =




eBeE + (1=2) (1− eB) (1− )
2 (1− e0B)
p (0; 0) = p (1; 1)
p (0; 1) = p (1; 0) :
Figure 4 shows the minimum required values of Eve’s er-
ror rate as a function of Bob’s error rate e0B for secure
key distribution (R > 0:) Though Bob can observe only
e0B values, he can estimate eB from the SNR of his de-
tection system. Eve will be detected if e0B  eB. The
detection is easy if Bob’s error rate is much lower than
Eve’s. A higher error rate of Bob may hide Eve. Secure
key distribution is possible even in this case. Suppose
eB = 0:1 and e0B = 0:15. As shown in Fig. 4, the secure
key distribution rate is positive if Eve’s error rate is larger
than 0.12. This error rate refers to 1.35 (1.3 dB) for the
maximum SNR allowed to Eve. Since Bob’s SNR should
be better than 0.089 (-10.5 dB) to keep the decision rate
at 10−3 and eB = 0:1, the advantage in SNR is 11.8 dB
for this weak light condition. The secure key distribution
is impossible with intense light, because Eve’s error rate
become close to zero.
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III. EXPERIMENT
In implementing YK protocol, we should code the bit
values to the signals with symmetric probability distri-
bution. We here employ so-called unipolar Manchester
code. This code represents "1" as a change from ON to
OFF and "0" as a change from OFF to ON. The unipolar
Manchester code can be decoded as follows: divide the
incident light into two. Set one light path longer than the
other by a half of pulse width. Then take a dierence of
the two lights by a balanced detector. The latter half of
the pulse slot yields a negative signal for "1" and a pos-
itive signal for "0". Binary phase shift keying (BPSK)
also yields a symmetric distribution by homodyne detec-
tion. Though BPSK would provide a superior sensitiv-
ity, unipolar Manchester code can be implemented much
more easily.
Figure 5 shows the experimental setup. Two dis-
tributed feedback(DFB) laser diodes (LDs) served as
light sources of 1.3 m wavelength. A pattern genera-
tor provided a signal pulse string to modulate DFB LD
directly. Another pattern generator was synchronized to
the other, and provided a pulse of 8 ns duration at the
beginning of the pulse string. The pulse modulated the
other DFB LD directly to generate a trigger. The output
of the signal LD was set weaker than that of the trigger
LD. The clock frequency was 25 MHz in the present ex-
periment. Only a xed pattern of 101010   was trans-
mitted for simplicity. The coded signal light then became
a square wave with duty of 50 % and pulse duration of 20
ns. We sent 30.8 kbits in one string. The outputs of the
two LDs were combined and attenuated by an attenuator
(ATT1.) We inserted a 50:50 divider to simulate translu-
cent attack by an eavesdropper. An attenuator (ATT2)
was placed in one arm of the divider to examine the SNR
tolerance for the secure key distribution. The signals of
each output were detected by a receiver. The receiver
consisted of a 50:50 divider, delay of a half pulse width,
and a balanced detector. The balanced detectors made
of two commercial InGaAs pin photodiodes loaded by 50
Ω resisters were operated in analog mode. The catalog
data (typical values) of the quantum eciency and the
dark current were 90 % and 5 nA at 25 C, respectively.
No intentional cooling was applied to the photodiodes.
The output signals of the receivers were led into ampli-
ers (G = 40 dB) followed by analog-digital converters.
The receivers yielded a pulse sequence of a negative pulse,
a space, a positive pulse, and a space. The pulses and
spaces were of 10 ns duration.
Figure 6 shows a typical probability distribution of the
output signal from the amplier. The probability distri-
bution is well represented by a sum of two Gaussians.
The intensity of the optical signal was 0.380 W (-34.2
dBm) at the input port of the receiver. SNR of this signal
was 1.0 (0 dB.) We averaged the output pulse over the
duration (10 ns), and measured the decision rate and er-
ror rate as a function of the SNR and the threshold. The
results are shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. The experimental
results agree well with the theory assuming white Gaus-
sian noise. These indicated that white Gaussian noise
dominated the present receiver sensitivity, and that the
security analysis described in Sec. 2 can be applied to
the experiment. The number of the sifted bits became
small for the decision rate less than 10−3, because of the
limited (30800) bits in the string. This insucient sam-
ple number caused the error rate fluctuation observed
for large m’s in Fig. 2. The noise level was almost same
as the dark noise level up to SNR=0 dB, but increased
as the signal intensity for larger SNR. The sensitivity
of the system was dominated by thermal noise, which is
constant to the input photon number, (dark current of
the photodiodes was negligible compared to the thermal
noise) for weak signals. The thermal noise was exceeded
by shot noise, which is proportional to the input pho-
ton number, as the intensity increased. SNR was thus
proportional to the square of the input power for weak
signals, and tended to be proportional to the input power
as the signal intensity increased.
The error rate shown in Fig. 2 provides a criterion
for secure key distribution against the opaque attack. A
low error rate of 0.038 was obtained for weak signals by
setting the threshold at m = 10, where the SNR was -
9.25 dB. The decisions were made at the rate of 0.0008,
slightly lower than 10−3. This error rate was lower than
the theoretical value of 0.072, due to the fluctuation de-
scribed above. Secure key distribution is possible if Eve’s
error rate is larger than 0.1, as obtained eB = 0 line in
Fig. 4 using larger error rate (0.072) for Bob. Eve’s SNR
of 0 dB was suciently small, because the error rate of
0.15 was obtained in the experiment. Bob’s advantage in
SNR was thus larger than 9.25 dB. This advantage was
almost constant for large SNR signals. However, a large
number of bits is required to generate a secure key. A sig-
nal with SNR=10 dB yielded an error rate of 2:6 10−4
(8 bits out of 30.8 kbits) at m = 0. It is necessary to
set a higher threshold value to obtain smaller error rate
than the above value for less SNR. Threshold value of
m = 4 yielded no error in the 52 bits that could be made
decisions. This implies that 52 (2:6 10−4) = 2 105
bits should be sent to detect an error in those 52 bits.
Security against the translucent attack was examined
as follows. We assigned one receiver that followed ATT2
as Bob, and the other receiver as Eve. ATT1 aected
the SNRs of both Bob and Eve, whereas ATT2 deter-
mined the ratio of the SNRs. The decisions in Bob were
recorded with several values of the threshold m, while the
Eve’s decisions were recorded with the threshold xed at
zero. We measured the error rate eB and decision rate
F+ of Bob, and the error rate eE of Eve. We estimated
the joint probabilities p(0; 0); p(0; 1), p(1; 0); and p(1; 1)
from the bit data that Bob made correct decisions. Fi-
nally we calculated the secure key distribution rate R by
Eqs. (1), (4), and (5). Figure 3 shows the secure key
distribution rate as a function of the error rates of Eve
and Bob. The symbols in Fig. 3 represents the secure key
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distribution rate estimated from the experiment. Experi-
mental results agree well with theory (lines.) The secure
key distribution was achieved above the R = 0 line in
Fig. 3. The decrease in Bob’s SNR reduced the range
of the signal intensity for secure key distribution. The
secure key distribution was impossible when Bob’s SNR
was less than 9 dB as small as Eve’s. This result also
agrees well with the prediction. We obtained the largest
practical secure key distribution rate F+R = 0:04 when
the both SNRs of Bob and Eve were unity (0 dB) and
Bob’s threshold was set to m = 2. The observed error
rates were 0.01 for Bob and 0.15 for Eve. The secure key
distribution rate was R = 0:29. Higher secure key dis-
tribution rates were observed by setting larger threshold
values. However, the reduction in the decision rate de-
creased the product F+R. Alice transmitted the signals
at the rate of 50 Mb/s, so that the key transmission rate
was 2 Mb/s in the present experiment. This is a hun-
dred times as fast as the key transmission rate reported
in the QKD experiments [6,10]. The transmission rate
was only limited by the electric circuits. One may obtain
the secure key transmission at 400 Mb/s if he employ a
10 Gb/s transmission channel.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
The theory and the experiments have shown that the
secure key distribution is possible as long as Bob’s SNR is
better than about -9 dB of the Eve’s. A practical crypto-
system should be designed not to permit Eve’s SNR to
exceed 9dB as large as Bob’s. Eve may stay much closer
to Alice than Bob. The ber loss results in the advantage
in Eve’s SNR. We estimate a limit of the transmission
distance in the following. It would be very dicult to
use complicated networks, where the path of a trac is
not xed. We have to construct a crypto-system on a
simple network or a point-point channel. Suppose con-
structing a point-to-point channel, for simplicity. SNR
is proportional to the square of the light intensity when
the system sensitivity is limited by thermal noise. Then
Bob’s advantage of 9 dB refers to the ber length of 22.5
km using a lowest loss ber (0.2 dB/km) and neglect-
ing connection loss. SNR is proportional to the light
intensity for the systems limited by shot noise. The ber
can be as long as 45 km in those systems. This values
would be increased assuming the translucent attack, be-
cause the eavesdropping results in the excess loss of the
system, and Eve should receive less signals than Bob to
avoid being detected.
Ampliers can be used in YK protocol as long as the
SNR permits. Ampliers will improve the SNR by re-
ducing the eect of the thermal noise. Therefore, the
ampliers are useful if the system is limited by the ther-
mal noise. In the shot noise limit, even an ideal amplier
reduces the SNR by 3 dB. The use of ampliers is re-
stricted by this degradation in the SNR. At most three
ampliers are thus possible.
The above estimation assumed that Bob and Eve em-
ploy the same detectors. Bob should reduce system noise
as possible to guarantee the security, by cooling the re-
ceiver, for example. If he suppress the thermal noise,
the SNR of his system will be limited by shot noise, the
standard quantum limit. YK protocol turns to a quan-
tum cryptography, though it uses coherent state light
[18]. SNR of 1 refers to mean photon number of 1 in the
systems limited by the shot noise. YK protocol provides
more ecient key distribution at higher bit rates than
other QKD protocols. However, YK protocol requires
the control of the signal intensity to keep Eve’s advan-
tage in SNR less than 9 dB. This would be a disadvantage
compared to the QKD protocols like BB84, where the
unconditional security is proved if the photons are gener-
ated by a perfect single photon source [19,20]. It would
be noteworthy that the security analysis described in the
present article will provide a security criteria for the B92
protocols employing dim coherent lights. The error rate
can be reduced below the standard quantum limit by op-
timum decision [21,22]. Security analysis based on quan-
tum detection theory as well as practical implementation
of the optimum decision are open for further studies.
V. CONCLUSION
A quantitative analysis on the security of Yuen-Kim
protocol shows that the secure key distribution is possible
even if the eavesdropper receives the signals with a better
signal-to-noise-ratio than the legitimate receiver. An ex-
periment using conventional ber optics agrees well with
the theory. The experiment shows that the legitimate re-
ceiver posses an advantage of 9 dB in the signal-to-noise-
ratio against the translucent attack by the eavesdropper.
These results have demonstrated a practical implementa-
tion of a secure key distribution protected by the laws of
physics. The security of the Yuen-Kim protocol is guar-
anteed in a range of the signal intensity for a system, so
that management of the transmission channel is neces-
sary to keep the signal-to-noise-ratio better than -9 dB
of possible eavesdroppers.
[1] Bennett C H and Bassard G 1984 Proceedingds IEEE
Int. Conf. on Computers, Systems, and Signal Process-
ing Banlore, India, 175
[2] Wiesner S 1983 Sigact News 15 78
[3] Ekert A K 1991 Phys. Rev. Lett. 67 661
[4] Bennett C H, Bassard G and Mermin N D 1992 Phys.
Rev. Lett. 68 557
[5] Bennett C H 1992 Phys. Rev. Lett. 68 3121
[6] Marand C and Townsend P D 1995 Opt. Lett. 20 1695
5
[7] Muller A, Herzog T, Huttner B, Tittel W, Zbinden H,
and Gisin N 1997 Appl. Phys. Lett. 70 793
[8] Merolla J-M, Mazurenko Y, Goedgebuer J-P, and Rhodes
W T 1999 Phys. Rev. Lett. 82 1656
[9] Bourennane M, Gibson F, Karlson A, Hening A, Jons-
son P, Tsegaye T, Ljunggren D, Sundberg E 1999 Opt.
Express 4 383
[10] Hughes R J, Morgan G L, and Peterson C G 1999 Los
Alamos e-print archive quant-ph/9904038
[11] Maurer U M 1993 IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 39 733
[12] Yuen H P and Kim A M 1998 Phys. Lett. A 241 135
[13] Ekert A K , Huttner B, Palma G M, and Peres A 1994
Phys. Rev. A 50 4298
[14] Brassard G and Salvail L 1993 Proceedings of Eurocrypt
'93 Loftus, Norway
[15] Bennett C H, Bassard G, Crepeau C, and Maurer U 1995
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 41 1915
[16] Lu¨tkenhaus N 1996 Phys. Rev. A 54 97
[17] Bru D and Lu¨tkenhaus N 1999 Los Alamos e-print
archive quant-ph/9901061
[18] Yuen H P 1998 Proceedings of the Fourth International
Conferece on Quantum Communication, Computing, and
Measuremet Evanston, IL, U. S. A.
[19] Mayers D 1996 Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings
of Crypto '96, Lecture Notes in Comp. Sci. vol. 1109
(Springer-Verlag) 343
[20] Mayers D 1998 Los Alamos e-print archive quant-
ph/9802025
[21] Helstrom C W 1976 Quantum Detection and Estimation
Theory (Academic, New York)
[22] Sasaki M and Hiroita O 1996 Phys. Lett. A 210 21
FIG. 1. Decision rate as a function of threshold with dierent values of signal-to-noise-ratio. Lines are calculated assuming
white Gaussian noise. Symbols are obtained in the experiment. Values of SNR are represented by diamonds: 7.8 dB, squares:
2.65 dB, triangles: -3.28 dB, crosses: -9.25 dB, stars: -15.1 dB, and circles: -21.4 dB.
FIG. 2. Error rate as function of threshold with dierent values of signal-to-noise-ratio. The meanings of the symbols are
same as Fig. 1.
FIG. 3. The requirement for Eve’s error rate as a function of Bob’s error rate to achieve secure key distribution against
translucent attack. Lines are calculated for the values of the secure key distribution rate R = 0, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.4. Symbols
represent the secure key distribution rate obtained in the experiment. Crosses denote R < 0, diamonds: 0 < R < 0:1, triangles:
0:1 < R < 0:2, squares: 0:1 < R < 0:2 and circles: R > 0:4.
FIG. 4. The requirement for Eve’s error rate as a function of Bob’s error rate to achieve secure key distribution against
opaque attack. Lines are calculated for the values of the Bob’s error rate without eavesdropping.
FIG. 5. Experimental set up for the demonstration of Yuen-Kim protocol. In Alice’s transmitter, pattern generators (PG)
drive two lasers. ATT., ATT1 and ATT2 stand for attenuetors. In the receivers of Bob and Eve, one of the divided light is
delayed. Lights are detected by balanced detectors made of two photodiodes, ADC stands for analog-digital converters and PC
stans for a personal computer.
FIG. 6. A typical probability distribution of the output signal from the amplier. Diamonds denote the experimental result.
Broken lines represent Gaussians used for tting. Full line shows the sum of the two Gaussians.
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